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ÔQuiet Americans in IndiaÕ:
1 
 
 The Central Intelligence Agency and the Politics of Intelligence in Cold War 
South Asia 
 
 
How is it that the poet got no applause when he recited his poem on the stage? 
How is it that the other poetÕs rhyme was not published in any paper? 
Why is so much tension in husband and wife? 
Why are the prices rising? 
Why the pupils gherao [lock-in] their principal? 
Why the parents are afraid of their adolescent daughters? 
Why there is so much nudity in films? 
And why our development plans fail to make any progress? 
The root cause of all these is just one. 
This is all due to the secret operations of the C.I.A. 
 
Dinkar Sonwalkar, ÔThe Root CauseÕ, Dharm Yug [Hindi Literary Magazine], 
November 1972. 
 
 
 
 
 
In February 1967, senior officials from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were horrified 
when the American west-coast magazine, Ramparts, exposed the US intelligence 
organisationÕs longstanding financial relationships with a number of international educational 
and cultural bodies. In a series of damning articles, reproduced in The New York Times and 
The Washington Post, Ramparts documented the CIAÕs provision of covert funding to, 
amongst others, the National Students Association, Asia Foundation, and Congress for 
Cultural Freedom (CCF). In India, where the fourth general election campaign to be held 
since the end of British imperial rule in August 1947 was then in full swing, confirmation that 
the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom, a local offshoot of the CCF, had accepted money 
from the CIA provoked an outpouring of public indignation. Chester Bowles, American 
                                                             
1
 The phrase ÔQuiet Americans in IndiaÕ is taken from an article on CIA activity in India published by the Soviet 
journalist, A. Shalnev, in the Moscow daily Sovetskaya Rossiya [Soviet Russia], 3 November 1972. The term, 
ÔQuiet AmericanÕ, became synonymous with CIA officers following the publication of Graham GreeneÕs novel, 
The Quiet American (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1955), a semi-fictional account of the tragically 
misguided intrusion into the First Indochina War of an American intelligence officer, Alden Pyle. 
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ambassador in New Delhi at the time, lamented that fallout from the Ramparts furore was 
likely to prove particularly damaging to United StatesÕ standing in India, Ôwhere we [the US] 
had developed especially close and extensive relationships with Indian universities and with 
individual scholars, none of which were in any way connected with intelligence operations.Õ2  
The public relations challenge Bowles faced in India as a result of the CIAÕs activities 
was complicated the following month when The Washington Post published an essay written 
by his predecessor in New Delhi, the Harvard economist, John Kenneth Galbraith. With no 
little irony, Galbraith observed that recent events had confirmed the CIA to be, Ôa secret 
agency...with an excellent instinct for headlines.Õ More significantly, Galbraith went on to 
recount his experiences of working alongside the CIA in the subcontinent, noting in the 
process, that the AgencyÕs, Ôactivities were generally known to, and involved no conflict 
with, local [Indian government] authorities.Õ3 In March 1961, before leaving to take up his 
ambassadorial posting, Galbraith had taken exception to the scale and scope of the CIAÕs 
interference in IndiaÕs internal affairs. During a briefing provided by Richard M. Bissell Jr., 
the AgencyÕs Deputy Director of Plans, or clandestine operations, Galbraith was Ôappalled 
and depressedÕ to learn of the CIAÕs intention to spend a sum Ôwell into the millions [of 
dollars]Õ to bankroll the election campaigns of pro-Western politicians, and subsidize anti-
communist Indian newspapers and magazines. Such activity, Galbraith lamented, was 
unlikely to prove effective in swaying Indian opinion, but was almost certain to leak into the 
public domain, damaging Indo-US relations and compromising his position as ambassador. 
Emboldened by the CIAÕs public humiliation following its disastrous Bay of Pigs operation 
against the Castro regime in Cuba that April, Galbraith attempted to rein in the AgencyÕs 
activities in India. Although only partially successful, the ambassadorÕs resolve to limit 
                                                             
2 Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 
p. 544. 
3 ÔCIA Needs a Tug on Its purse StringsÕ, John Kenneth Galbraith, The Washington Post, 12 March 1967. 
 3 
 
covert American intelligence operations in the subcontinent earned the disapprobation of the 
Agency, which dismissed him as, Ôbasically anti-CIA.Õ4   
Back in 1967, opposition groups on the left of IndiaÕs political spectrum seized upon 
GalbraithÕs comments in The Washington Post as confirmation that the CIA had been 
actively subverting democracy in South Asia. Exasperated by GalbraithÕs indiscretion, the 
CIAÕs Director, Richard Helms, curtly informed the former ambassador that he had, Ôraised 
unshirted hell in India and [had]...provided the central point of an acrimonious debate in the 
Lok Sabha [IndiaÕs lower parliamentary chamber].Õ5 Fresh from the campaign hustings, 
IndiaÕs parliamentarians fed off rumour and suspicion surrounding AmericaÕs foreign 
intelligence service, and competed eagerly with each other to exhibit the toughest and most 
populist anti-CIA line possible. On 23 March, IndiaÕs Foreign Minister, M. C. Chagla, bowed 
to mounting pressure for government action and announced that a ÔthoroughÕ official inquiry 
would be conducted to ascertain whether the CIA had interfered in Indian politics. ÔWe 
cannot permit foreigners or foreign governments to dictate to us what sort of a government 
we should have or what sort of people should be elected,Õ Chagla asserted. ÔWe will unearth 
any activity that is objectionable, that is against the national interests.Õ6 
The global spotlight that AmericaÕs press cast upon some of the CIAÕs more 
questionable activities in early 1967, was to have a profound and enduring impact upon 
Indian perceptions of America and its intelligence services. In the wake of the Ramparts 
                                                             
4
 John Kenneth Galbraith A Life in our Times: Memoirs (London: Andre Deutsch, 1981), pp. 394-7. Harry 
Rositzke, the CIA Station chief in New Delhi during GalbraithÕs tenure as ambassador, later confirmed that 
much of the AgencyÕs political activity in India, and use of the subcontinent as a support base for operations 
mounted in Chinese controlled Tibet, continued through the 1960s. Richard Parker, John Kenneth Galbraith: 
His Life, His Politics, His Economics (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), pp. 354-55. See also, 
Galbraith to Averell Harriman, George Ball, and George McGhee, 30 November 1961, Box 463, John Kenneth 
Galbraith, Folder 2, Averell W. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Washington DC.; 
Diary entry for 29 March 1961, Washington, John Kenneth Galbraith, AmbassadorÕs Journal: A Personal 
Account of the Kennedy Years, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), p. 51; and, Duane R. Clarridge, A Spy for All 
Seasons: My Life in the CIA (New York: Scribner, 1997), p.  84. 
5
 Richard Helms to Lyndon Johnson, 28 March 1967, Box 9, Folder CIA Vol. 3 [1 of 2], NSF, AF, Lyndon 
Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter LBJL). 
6 ÔIndia to Conduct Inquiry on C.I.A.Õ, The New York Times, 24 March 1967. 
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scandal, the CIA came to occupy a prominent place in mainstream Indo-US cultural and 
political discourse. Indeed, for the remainder of the twentieth century, and beyond, anti-
American elements inside and outside India drew repeatedly upon the spectre of CIA 
subversion as a means of destabilising New DelhiÕs relations with Washington. The blanket 
exposure given by the worldÕs press to CIA indiscretions after 1967, exemplified by the 
international media circusÕ that developed around Congressional probes into the US 
intelligence community in the mid-1970s, made a deep psychological impression in India. 
Having publicly catalogued the CIAÕs involvement in a series of plots to assassinate national 
leaders and subvert foreign governments, the chairman of one influential investigative 
committee, the Democrat Senator from Idaho, Frank Church, famously characterised the 
AgencyÕs behaviour as akin to, Ôa rogue elephant on a rampage.Õ7 Moreover, in IndiaÕs Prime 
Minister, Indira Gandhi, whose Congress Party saw its parliamentary majority slashed at the 
polls in 1967, India was governed for much of the next two decades by a leader with a 
visceral mistrust of Western intelligence services in general, and the CIA in particular. One 
former CIA officer, who served in India in the early 1970s, recalled that, ÔCIA agents...were 
to be found according to Madame Gandhi, beneath every charpoy and behind every neem 
tree.Õ8  
Remarkably, some reference to the CIA and its purportedly nefarious activities in the 
subcontinent can be detected in almost every significant exchange that occurred between 
Indian and American diplomats between the late 1960s and the late 1980s. In fact, during the 
latter half of the Cold War, what some commentators have referenced as an Indian national 
ÔparanoiaÕ toward the CIA and its clandestine activities, came to represent a constant and 
frustrating impediment whenever US policymakers sought to forge closer and more 
                                                             
7
 See Frank Church, 25 September 1975, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities, Washington D. C. INTERNET,  
http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/vol2/pdf/ChurchV2_3_Brennan.pdf 
8 Russell Jack Smith, The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency (New York: Berkley Books, 
1992), p. 13. 
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constructive relations with India.9 In the mid-1980s, senior officials in the Reagan 
administration continued to bemoan that, ÔMrs. GandhiÕs periodic swipes at the U.S. for 
interference in Indian internal affairs infuriate Congressmen and staffers alike.Õ10 In June 
1984, having recently returned from a visit to the subcontinent, US Vice-President, and 
former CIA Director, George W. Bush, felt compelled to write a letter of complaint to R. N. 
Kao, the head of IndiaÕs external intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing 
(RAW). Bush had taken exception to comments made by Indian government officials that 
linked the CIA with a secessionist movement in the Punjab, in northern India. In a private 
letter to Kao, an exasperated Bush emphasised: 
 
...how taken aback I was to hear of recent Indian accusations concerning alleged 
CIA involvement in the Punjab. Media articles and statements by government 
officials linking CIA operations with occurrences in Amritsar are completely 
contrary to the fact and quite distressing. This turn of events is particularly 
unfortunate coming so closely on the heels of my statement in New Delhi 
respecting the unity and integrity of India and my long discussions with your 
Prime Minister.11 
 
Some three decades earlier, one of the very first books to reference the CIA, L. 
NatarajanÕs, American Shadow over India, had been published in Bombay. The account that 
Natarajan provided of the CIAÕs activities in India in 1952, which, if the author is to be 
believed, encompassed bribing Indian publishers, journalists and politicians to follow a pro-
American line, generated little public or political comment in the subcontinent.12 By the end 
of the following decade, however, Indian authors and journalists had turned the chronicling 
of CIA misdeeds in South Asia, real and imagined, into something of a cottage industry. In 
                                                             
9 Richard J. Aldrich, ÔÒThe Value of Residual EmpireÓ: Anglo-American Intelligence Co-operation in Asia after 
1945Õ in Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy: British policy in the Post-war World, (eds.) Richard J. Aldrich 
and Michael F. Hopkins (London: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 246.  
10 ÔUS Congressional Perspectives of IndiaÕ, Peter Tomsen, Twenty-Sixth Session, 1983-84, United States 
Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Country File India 1985 [3] [OA-ID 19797], George W. Bush 
Library, College Station Texas (hereafter GWBL). 
11 George W. Bush to R.N. Kao, 19 June 1984, Country File India 1984 [1] [OA-ID 19779], GWBL. 
12  L. Natarajan, American Shadow over India (Bombay: PeopleÕs Publishing House, 1952). 
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the late 1960s, communist publishing houses in India churned out evocatively entitled works 
such as, I Was a CIA Agent in India; CIA: Manipulating Arm of U.S. Foreign Policy; Devil 
and his Dart: How the CIA is Plotting in the Third World; and, CIA: Dagger against India.13 
The ubiquitous hand of the CIA had, such works proclaimed, been behind plots to oust 
IndiaÕs first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, from power; assassinate Indira Gandhi, and 
her son Rajiv; encourage separatist movements in the north, west and south of India; and 
perhaps most bizarrely, implement a evangelisation plan to covert IndiaÕs overwhelming 
Hindu population to Christianity.14 References to the CIA also began to cross over into 
conventional Indian literature. Notably, in 1964, the Agency appeared briefly in V. S. 
NaipaulÕs classic work, An Area of Darkness: A Discovery of India.15 In contrast, a 
comprehensive account of the CIAÕs cold war operations in India and, more precisely, the 
AgencyÕs wider impact on Indo-US relations remains a notable lacuna within the 
considerable body of scholarly work addressing AmericaÕs intelligence community.16 The 
memoirs of CIA Directors and former Agency officials largely omit reference to India, or 
                                                             
13 John D. Smith, I Was a CIA Agent in India (New Delhi: New Age Printing Press, 1967); Pauly V. Parakal, 
CIA Dagger against India (New Delhi: New Age Press, 1973); Kunhanandan Nair, Devil and His Dart: How 
the CIA is Plotting in the Third World (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1986); and, Pandit Sheel Bhadra Yajee, 
CIA: Manipulating Arm of U.S. Foreign Policy: 40 Years of CIA Manoeuvres against Freedom and Dignity 
(New Delhi: Criterion Publications, 1987). See also, Satish Kumar, CIA and the Third World: A Study in 
Crypto-Diplomacy (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1981); and, Rustem Galiullin, The CIA in Asia: Covert 
Operations against India and Afghanistan, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1988). Leaping on to the CIA 
bandwagon, L. Natarajan produced a flurry of further books on the Agency following the Ramparts revelations. 
See, L. Natarajan, Assassination Bureau, Inc. (New Delhi: Perspective Publications, 1967); and, AmericaÕs Two 
Pincers (Lucknow: Pradip Prakashan, 1970). 
14 ÔConspiracy TheoriesÕ, Hindustan Times, 1 October 2005, ÔIndia talks of CIA role in UnrestÕ, The New York 
Times, 16 June 1984; ÔIndia's Search for Villain Finds Old Culprit: The CIAÕ, The Washington Post, 14 June 
1991. 
15 Naipaul recounts sardonically how, during his travels across India between February 1962 and February 1964, 
he, Ôhad grown tired of meeting young Americans in unlikely places. It was amusing, and charitable, to think 
that some of them were spies for the CIA or whatever it was.Õ V. S. Naipaul, An Area of Darkness: A Discovery 
of India (London: Andre Deutsch, 1964), p. 172. 
16 Little light is shed on the CIAÕs activities in India, for instance, in works such as, Victor Marchetti and John 
D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974); John Ranelagh, The Agency: 
The Rise and Decline of the CIA (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986); Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and 
American Democracy (London: Yale University Press, 1998); John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret 
Wars of the CIA, (New Amsterdam Books 2006); or, Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, 
(London: Allen Lane, 2007). 
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skim over intelligence operations in the subcontinent.17 Likewise, accounts of ambassadorial 
tours in the subcontinent, penned by such luminaries as Galbraith, Bowles, and Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, offer only tantalisingly brief glimpses of the scale, scope and broader significance 
of CIA activity inside Ôthe worldÕs largest democracyÕ.18 
IndiaÕs historic association with the development of modern intelligence practice is, in 
fact, particularly strong. Scholars of the subcontinent have documented the extensive 
networks of indigenous spies, political informants and propagandists that were co-opted by 
the East India Company from the eighteenth century to safeguard British interests in South 
Asia from internal revolt and external threats, originally from France, and latterly from 
imperial Russia. By the time the British retreated from the subcontinent in the aftermath of 
the Second World War, the manipulation by colonial security agencies of a deep and flexible 
system of social communication in India had contributed to a proliferation of amorphous 
ÔimaginedÕ communities with purportedly sinister and subversive anti-nationalist agendas.19 
In this context, the deployment of preponderant post-war American power and wealth in 
Europe and Asia appeared redolent to many Indians of a hidden neo-imperialist US foreign 
policy. More specifically, the CIA, as the ÔcovertÕ foreign policy tool of choice for US 
PresidentÕs in the early Cold War period, acquired a uniquely invidious status across the 
developing world as an anti-democratic socio-political malefactor. Indeed, in India, as 
elsewhere in the global South, from the late 1960s the symbolism attached to the CIA 
                                                             
17 See, for example, Richard Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency (New 
York: Random House, 2003); George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA, (London: Harper 
Press, 2007); Harry Rositzke, The CIAÕs Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage and Covert Action 
(Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1988); J.B. Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior (New York: ScribnerÕs, 1976). A 
significant exception is ClarridgeÕs, A Spy for All Seasons, which details aspects of ClarridgeÕs work as a CIA 
field officer in New Delhi and Madras in the early 1960s.  
18 Galbraith, AmbassadorÕs Journal, and Life in Our Times; Bowles, Promises to Keep; Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, A Dangerous Place (Boston: Little Brown, 1978). 
19 See, in particular, C. A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social communication in 
India, 1780-1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); R. J. Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial 
Defence (London: Routledge, 1995); and, Milton Israel, Communications and Power: Propaganda and the 
Press in the Indian Nationalist Struggle, 1920-47 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). The concept 
of Ôimagined communitiesÕ was popularised by Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections of the 
Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). 
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overshadowed American diplomatic initiatives designed to win Ôhearts and mindsÕ. Trust and 
confidence in US domestic institutions and amongst AmericaÕs international partners, and 
perhaps none more so than India, was corroded by a climate of conspiracy surrounding the 
CIA, which, in turn, fostered a political culture in the subcontinent that at times verged on 
paranoia. 
By drawing upon theoretical frameworks utilized in recent studies of conspiracy 
theory, important new light can be shed on the political and cultural influences that have 
conditioned Indian perceptions of the CIA. Specifically, the manner in which the CIAÕs 
notoriety in the subcontinent after 1967 was harnessed by left-wing sections of IndiaÕs 
political class to nurture populist anti-American sentiment, is suggestive of a systematic 
effort, whether conscious or subconscious, to associate the Agency with a broad conspiracy, 
centred on a plot to secure control of India, and the wider developing world.20 Here, parallels 
are evident with work conducted on the political dimension of conspiracy theories in the 
Middle East. In this context, scholars have demonstrated how notions of ÔconspiracismÕ 
gained currency in mainstream political and media circles, and were subsequently exploited 
by authoritarian regimes to attribute poverty, economic decline and social stagnation to the 
imaginary construction of hostile external forces.21 Furthermore, in interpreting Indira 
GandhiÕs interaction with Western intelligence agencies in general, and the CIA in particular, 
emphasis is placed on the extent to which GandhiÕs family history, psychological make-up, 
and familiarity with the AgencyÕs covert action record in the developing world, amplified 
traits of insecurity and paranoia buried deep within the Indian premierÕs psyche. Informed by 
                                                             
20
 For insights into the political dimensions of conspiracy theories, see, Michael Barkun, A Culture of 
Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); 
Mark Fenster, Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2008); Daniel Pipes (1997). Conspiracy: How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where It 
Comes from (New York: The Free Press, 1997); and, Kathryn S. Olmsted, Real Enemies: Conspiracy Theories 
and American Democracy, World War I to 9/11 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.) 
21
 See, for example, Daniel Pipes, The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1998). 
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the insights into psychological projection provided by Richard Hofstadter back in the 1960s, 
and more recent investigations into the malevolent ÔdiseaseÕ of political paranoia by Robert 
Robins and Jerrold Post, it is argued that the emergence of a conspiratorial paradigm in 
Indian politics around the turn of the 1970s, centred on the CIA, had a significant, enduring 
and detrimental impact upon Indo-US relations.22   
 
ÔThe most satisfactory relationshipÕ: Indian intelligence liaison with the West in the 
early Cold War 
 
Following the end of British colonial rule in South Asia, both the CIA and the United 
KingdomÕs Security Service (MI5) moved quickly to establish close liaison relationships 
with, and provide training and support to, the IndiaÕs intelligence service, the Delhi 
Intelligence Bureau (IB). In June 1949, the IBÕs first Indian director, Tirupattur Gangadharam 
(T. G.) Sanjevi, a 49-year-old former District Superintendent of Police from Madras, 
travelled to the United States for three weeks of talks with representatives from the CIA, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the State Department. The importance that 
Washington attached to SanjeviÕs visit was underlined by George Kennan, then Director of 
Policy Planning at the State Department, and one of the driving forces behind the creation of 
the Office of Policy Coordination, which until the creation of the CIAÕs Directorate of Plans 
in 1952, oversaw covert US psychological and paramilitary operations. In a memorandum 
distributed to the heads of AmericaÕs intelligence agencies, Kennan stressed that Sanjevi, 
who was known to be Ôvery closeÕ to Jawaharlal Nehru, should Ônot only be given a cordial 
reception, but that high officials of our Government receive him.Õ Reinforcing KennanÕs 
message, AmericaÕs ambassador in New Delhi, Loy Henderson, cautioned Washington that 
                                                             
22 Richard Hofstadter, ÔThe Paranoid Style in American PoliticsÕ, Harper's Magazine (1964), pp. 77Ð86; Robert 
Robins and Jerrold Post, Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1997). 
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the impressions Sanjevi took away from his trip to the United States were likely to have, 
Ôwide ramifications in our over-all relations with India.Õ23  
At the time, IndiaÕs security and intelligence forces were battling to suppress a violent 
communist-led insurrection in Telegana, in the south of the country. American diplomats 
were hopeful that the on-going threat posed by militant communism inside India would 
encourage Sanjevi to solicit advice and support from his counterparts in the United States. In 
the event, after meeting with a number of senior CIA figures, including Colonel Richard 
Stilwell, chief of the AgencyÕs Far East Division, Kermit ÔKimÕ Roosevelt, shortly to achieve 
notoriety for his exploits in Iran, and Director of Central Intelligence, Roscoe Hillenkoetter, 
SanjeviÕs visit was deemed by Washington to have passed off successfully.24 Significantly, 
and to the CIAÕs immense satisfaction, Sanjevi welcomed an American offer to explore, Ôthe 
possibility of establishing an official liaison on Communist matters.Õ25 Intriguingly, a detailed 
profile of IndiaÕs intelligence director that was distributed to US officials ahead of his visit to 
the United States, was marked out for Ômost careful handlingÕ in view of the ÔdelicacyÕ of its 
principal source. Sanjevi, it seems, may not have been the first senior Indian government 
official to forge a working relationship with the CIA.26 
                                                             
23 J. C. Satterthwaite to James E. Webb, 15 June 1949, RG59, Office of South Asian Affairs India Affairs 1944-
57, Lot file 57D373, Box 2, Folder Memorandum to the Secretary 1949, National Archive and Records 
Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NARA). 
24 Joseph S. Sparks to Loy W. Henderson, 8 July 1949, RG59, Office of South Asian Affairs India Affairs 1944-
57, Lot file 57D373, Box 2, Folder Official Informal July 1949, NARA. 
25 Sanjevi was a good deal less enamoured with the reception that he received from the FBI, and in particular, 
the BureauÕs imperious Director, J. Edgar Hoover. To the distress of Loy Henderson, Sanjevi subsequently 
confided to the US ambassador that having, Ôbeen looking forward with particular enthusiasm to meeting and 
having a heart-to-heart with...J. Edgar HooverÕ, he had been left Ôboiling with resentmentÕ by the off-hand 
manner in which Hoover had treated him. The Ôdeep-seated piqueÕ, which Sanjevi harboured toward Hoover 
was underscored when the Indian intelligence chief stated unequivocally to a shocked Henderson that, Ôif a 
liaison was contemplated [between US and Indian intelligence services] even remotely involving the F.B.I....he 
[Sanjevi] would not only advise against us making such a proposal but would personally oppose it if it were 
made.Õ See, Loy W. Henderson to Joseph S. Sparks, 17 April 1950, and Richard W. Klise to Loy Henderson, 18 
April 1950, RG59, Office of South Asian Affairs India Affairs 1944-57, Lot file 57D373, Box 2, Folder Official 
informal Jan-May 1950, NARA. 
26
 J. C. Satterthwaite to James E. Webb, 15 June 1949, RG59, Office of South Asian Affairs India Affairs 1944-
57, Lot file 57D373, Box 2, Folder Memorandum to the Secretary 1949, NARA. 
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Under Sanjevi, and his successor, B. N. Mullik, who assumed control of IB in July 
1950, the CIA and MI5, the latter of which maintained a declared, or overt, Security Liaison 
Officer (SLO) in New Delhi, enjoyed close collaborative relations with IndiaÕs intelligence 
services into the 1970s.27 Notably, the IB chose to Ôlook the other wayÕ as CIA aircraft 
transited through Indian airspace in support of Agency sponsored resistance operations in 
Chinese controlled Tibet, and CIA operatives spirited the Dalai Lama out of Lhasa and into 
northern India following an abortive Tibetan uprising in 1959.28 Indeed, by the early 1960s, 
the CIA had a sizable, growing and active in-country presence in India. Having initially 
operated from a single ÔstationÕ, or base of operations, in New Delhi, the Agency 
progressively extended the geographical scope of its activities, establishing a network of 
smaller out-stations in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. Inevitably, as the scale of CIA activity 
in India increased, the Agency found it increasingly difficult to preserve its anonymity. 
Abraham Michael Rosenthal, the New York TimesÕ correspondent in New Delhi for much of 
the 1950s, confided to his editor back in the United States that local CIA staff working under 
the guise of Treasury experts, Air Force contractors or members of specialised bodies, such 
as the Asia Foundation, were easily identified by Indian government officials and journalists. 
Agency personnel in India, Rosenthal noted, were widely referred to by Americans and 
                                                             
27
 MI5 stationed SLOÕs across Asia and Africa after 1945, where under the ÔAttlee DirectiveÕ, the Empire and 
Commonwealth remained primarily the preserve of the Security Service, and insulated from the clandestine 
activities of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). The SLO role was to provide advice and support to 
local security agencies, whilst at the same time acting as conduit for the exchange of security related 
information between London and BritainÕs former imperial outposts. It was not to engage in acts of subterfuge 
or espionage. The first SLO in India, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Bourne, arrived in New Delhi in 1947, while 
the last, a victim of Whitehall economies, was withdrawn, against the wishes of the then head of IB, S. P. 
Varma, in the late 1960s. See, Visit of Captain Liddell (Security Service) to the Middles EastÕ, Confidential 
Annex to J.I.C. (47) 33rd Meeting (0), 9 June 1947, CAB 159/1; and Roger Hollis to Sir Burke Trend, 13 
November 1965, CO 1035/171, British National Archives, Kew London (hereafter, TNA). See also, Christopher 
Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 2009) p. 137 and p. 
481.  
28 See, Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, The CIAÕs Secret War in Tibet (Lawrence: University of Kansas 
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Indians alike, as Ôthe Halicrafter boysÕ, Ôbecause whatever their Embassy cover they all had 
offices in the same part of the Embassy basement and all had identical Halicrafter radios.Õ 
The CIAÕs involvement in Indian political circles, Rosenthal observed, appeared to be 
directed, Ômore than anything else in getting inside the Congress Party for purposes of 
information or influence.Õ29 In 1959, the Agency demonstrated its ability and willingness to 
work with IndiaÕs ruling political party, when it helped to pave the way for the removal of a 
democratically elected Communist Party of India (CPI) government in the southern state of 
Kerala. By secretly channelling funds to Congress Party officials and local anti-communist 
labour leaders, the CIA helped to destabilise, and ultimately bring down, the incumbent CPI 
administration.30  
In a wider sense, in the late 1950s, toward the end of Dwight D. EisenhowerÕs second 
presidential term, Washington had become increasingly concerned both at the growth of 
indigenous communism in the subcontinent, and the Soviet UnionÕs burgeoning ties with 
New Delhi. EisenhowerÕs enthusiasm for bringing India and the United States closer together, 
primarily through the provision of generous American economic aid to NehruÕs 
administration, was subsequently embraced by his successor, John F. Kennedy, who looked 
upon democratic India as a strategic counterweight to the expansion of Communist Chinese 
influence in Asia. Indeed, at the beginning of the 1960s, and in particular for a brief period 
following the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, the locus of WashingtonÕs effort to contain 
                                                             
29 Abraham Michael Rosenthal to Mr. Salisbury, undated, Box 159, CIA Series 1965-66, Raw Data, Harrison 
Salisbury Papers, Butler Library, Columbia University (hereafter HSP). 
30 Ellsworth Bunker, US ambassador to India between 1956 and 1961, confirmed in 1979 that the CIA had 
funnelled money to the Congress Party in the late 1950s, through S.K. Patil, a Congress leader from 
Maharashtra, to sustain its campaign of opposition to the communist administration in Kerala. See, Ellsworth 
Bunker, Oral History, 18 Jun. & 17 Jul. 1979, New York, Butler Library, Columbia University, pp. 67-8. More 
junior US officials, such as David S. Burgess, Labour attach at the US Embassy in New Delhi between 1955 
and 1960, have corroborated bunkerÕs testimony. See, David. S. Burgess, Oral History, 7 April 1991, Foreign 
Affairs Oral History Project (hereafter FAOHP), INTERNET, 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, US ambassador to India in the 
early 1970s, has confirmed that the CIA was used to fund Congress Party campaigns against the Communist 
Party of India in Kerala and West Bengal. See, Moynihan, A Dangerous Place, p. 41. 
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Asian communism was located not in South Vietnam, but in India.31 A series of very public 
CIA ÔfailuresÕ around this time, beginning with the loss of a U-2 spy-plane over the Soviet 
Union in May 1960, and culminating in the Bay of Pigs fiasco the following April, had little 
immediate impact on Indo-US relations, or more pertinently, co-operation in the intelligence 
field. In July 1961, whilst on a tour of the southern India, John Kenneth Galbraith was 
surprised, and faintly amused, when in the course of being introduced to a group of local 
dignitaries, a man stepped forward and exclaimed exuberantly, Ò'Mr. Ambassador, I am the 
superintendent of police here in Madras. I would like to tell you that I have the most 
satisfactory relationship with your spies.Ó32  
In the aftermath of the following yearÕs Sino-Indian border war, Indian and American 
intelligence agencies further strengthened their working relationships. Notably, the CIA 
assisted the IB in equipping and training a clandestine warfare unit tasked with monitoring 
Chinese military supply routes into Tibet. Under an agreement reached between James 
Critchfield, chief of the CIAÕs Near East operations, and B. N. Mullik, Langley furnished 
support to the Indo-Tibetan Special Frontier Force (SFF), a unit modelled on the US Army 
Green Berets, or special forces. From the winter of 1964, SFF operations along the Sino-
Indian border were co-ordinated through a joint Indo-US command centre in New Delhi. The 
Agency also oversaw the insertion of nuclear-powered surveillance equipment on two of 
IndiaÕs Himalayan peaks, with a view to collecting data on Chinese atomic tests.33 One US 
                                                             
31 The evolution of Indo-US relations under Eisenhower and Kennedy has received significant scholarly 
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Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Dennis Merrill, Bread and the Ballot: The United 
States and IndiaÕs Economic Development (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Andrew 
Rotter, Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); 
and, Richard P. Dauer, A North-South Mind in an East-West World: Chester Bowles and the Making of United 
States Cold War Foreign Policy, 1951-1969 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2005). 
32 ÔThe Year of the Spy (in a Manner of Speaking)Õ, John Kenneth Galbraith, The New York Times, 5 January 
1986.  
33 See, Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy, 14 October 1965, NSF, Robert W. Komer Papers, Box 13, Folder 6 
Bundy, McG - Decisions 1965-66; and, Walt Rostow to President Johnson, 30 April 1966, NSF, Intelligence 
File, Box 2, Folder India's Unconventional Warfare Force, LBJL. Also, M.S. Kohli and Kenneth Conboy, Spies 
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diplomat, who served in the US Embassy in New Delhi throughout the first half of the 1960s, 
subsequently verified that the AgencyÕs presence in India at the time was, Ôvery large, and 
very invasive...the CIA was deeply involved in the Indian Government.Õ34  
In fact, although many Indian government officials were aware of the existence of 
liaison relationships between the IB and their British and American counterparts, IndiaÕs 
intelligence chiefs worked hard to disguise the true extent and significance of their 
collaboration with Western intelligence agencies. In large part, such caution reflected a 
realisation on the part of senior IB officers that, as B. N. Mullik reflected, IndiaÕs premier, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, held a ÔnaturalÕ and Ôstrong prejudiceÕ against much of the work performed 
by intelligence organisations.35 In April 1950, T. G. Sanjevi had reassured American officials 
that, Ôhe frequently had to take independent action without the knowledge of his 
governmentÕ, and, Ôregardless of the official attitude of his government, he would welcome 
the continuance of...unofficial contacts.Õ36 Once he had succeeded Sanjevi, Mullik deemed it 
equally prudent to keep IBÕs links with British and American intelligence agencies as quiet as 
possible. Were Nehru to get wind of the scale of IndiaÕs partnership with the CIA and MI5, 
Mullik explained to one British intelligence officer, much of the liaison activity would have 
to be curtailed.37  
When viewed through the prism of NehruÕs family history, the suspicion and distrust 
that the Indian premier, and more significantly, his daughter, Indira Gandhi, harboured 
toward foreign intelligence agencies is unsurprising. Before IndiaÕs independence in 1947, 
when not languishing in British prisons, both Nehru and Gandhi had been subjected to 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
in the Himalayas: Secret Missions and Perilous Climbs (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2003); and, 
Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War, pp. 265-276. 
34 Ambassador Mary Seymour Olmsted, Oral History, 8 April 1992, FAOHP, INTERNET, 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/. 
35 B.N. Mullik, My Years with Nehru, 1948-1964 (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1972), p. 57.  
36 Richard W. Klise to Loy Henderson, 18 April 1950, RG59, Office of South Asian Affairs India Affairs 1944-
57, Lot file 57D373, Box 2, Folder Official informal Jan-May 1950, NARA. 
37 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 445-6. 
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oppressive surveillance by a British imperial security service that one contemporary 
American observer lauded as, Ôthe finest political intelligence organisation in the world.Õ38 In 
later life, Gandhi emphasised the deep psychological impression left by witnessing Ôa large 
number of relatives, on both my fatherÕs and motherÕs sideÕ hounded and imprisoned for 
expressing political opinions inimical to the British Raj. ÔI do not know of any other family,Õ 
Gandhi observed, Ôwhich was so involved in the freedom struggle and its hardships.Õ39 In 
post-independence South Asia, however, it was anxiety over CIA activity undertaken without 
the knowledge and approval of the Indian government, that most exercised the Nehru clan. In 
June 1955, in a speech delivered to a gathering of Indian diplomats in Salzburg, Austria, 
Jawaharlal Nehru made it clear that he regarded the CIA as an especially invidious threat to 
Indian democracy. ÔThe United States are carrying on their espionage and secret service 
activities [inside India],Õ Nehru assured his audience. ÔThey have also been buying up 
newspapers and spreading a network of publicity organisations... We are more concerned 
with what the Americans are trying to do than the others.Õ40  
  The unease that IndiaÕs political leadership felt towards the CIA were reflected in the 
AgencyÕs endeavours to maintain a low public profile. In 1965, shortly after being posted to 
New Delhi, the New York TimesÕ correspondent, Anthony Lukas, noted that in India the CIA 
did its best to operate, Ôvery much on the hush-hush.Õ In contrast to the more overt presence 
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that it adopted in other parts of the developing world, such as the Congo, in India, Lukas 
found that the Agency went to, Ôgreat efforts to pretend that it doesnÕt exist.Õ The AgencyÕs 
challenge in disguising the ever-greater numbers of its officers seconded to the American 
embassy faintly amused Lukas, who much like Rosenthal before him, found little difficulty in 
identifying US intelligence personnel. The CIAÕs resolve to keep its presence in India out of 
the public spotlight was made abundantly clear to the American journalist after he published 
a Ôlight yarnÕ in the Times. LukasÕ report referenced the emergence of a Ôprotest movementÕ 
amongst American diplomats, led by an unnamed CIA official, against plans to cull some 
ducks that had taken up residence in a pool within the US Embassy compound. Within days 
of the stories publication, Lukas was summoned to the Embassy by the resident press attach, 
and tersely informed that he had been decreed persona non grata by the local CIA station 
chief. ÔI was told,Õ Lukas advised his superiors back in New York, Ôthat I had gravely 
compromised the agencyÕs security here.Õ ÔWhat, I asked incredulously, had I done? The 
answer: I had informed the Indians that the C.I.A. was operating out of the Embassy.Õ41 
The CIAÕs reaction to LukasÕ article was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that 
IndiaÕs broader relationship with the United States was under considerable strain at that time. 
Once Lyndon Johnson had entered the White House in November 1963, AmericaÕs focus 
shifted inexorably away from the Indian subcontinent, and toward South East Asia. 
Consequently, diplomatic tensions between Washington and New Delhi on issues ranging 
from the provision of military assistance, the supply of food aid, and the escalating conflict in 
Vietnam, were left to fester. In particular, having received the lionÕs share of American 
overseas developmental assistance and food aid from the late 1950s, many Indians felt 
humiliated by the cycle of dependency that had come to characterise their countryÕs 
relationship with the United States. As the subcontinent experienced a succession of droughts 
                                                             
41
 Anthony Lukas to Tom Wicker, 18 October 1965, Box 159 CIA Series 1965-66 Raw Data, HSP. See also, 
ÔDucks Reprieved at a U.S. EmbassyÕ, The New York Times, 6 June 1965. 
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in the 1960s, IndiaÕs increasing reliance on American surplus wheat and rice to stave off 
famine, generated more resentment than goodwill. ÔThe American role here,Õ one Western 
journalist in India opined, Ôhas been an object lesson in how to give aid and win enemies.Õ42 
Efforts by American officials in India, led by Chester Bowles, to maintain constructive 
diplomatic relations with New Delhi were not helped by a series of revelations that suggested 
the CIA had recruited assets, or informers, at the very top levels of the Indian government. 
Among those alleged to have worked for US intelligence, was Mac Mathai, NehruÕs private 
secretary. One of the Indian Prime MinisterÕs foremost biographerÕs has gone as far as to 
state that throughout MathaiÕs period of government service between 1946 and 1959, Ôthe 
CIA had access to every paper passing through NehruÕs Secretariat.Õ43 
 
ÔSpies and SaboteursÕ: The intelligence Cold War comes to India 
 
At the same time that the United StatesÕ association with India was coming under strain, the 
Soviet UnionÕs relationship with New Delhi began to blossom. Until Joseph StalinÕs death in 
1953, the Soviet government had disparaged India as an imperialist puppet. Both Nehru, and 
IndiaÕs spiritual leader, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, had routinely been dismissed by 
Moscow as bourgeois reactionaries. Under Nikita KhrushchevÕs leadership, however, with 
ideological fervour having been displaced with a more pragmatic approach to international 
affairs, the Soviet Union embarked upon a concerted effort to woo nascent post-colonial 
states. IndiaÕs huge population, untapped economic potential, shared anxiety at ChinaÕs 
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 ÔNot so quiet AmericansÕ, The Guardian, 28 October 1972. 
43 Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol.3, 1956-1964 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1984), p. 122. 
Gopal based his assertion on records of discussions that had taken place between his father, and IndiaÕs 
President, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, and V. Sahay, IndiaÕs Cabinet Secretary, in 1966. Nehru had asked the 
Cabinet Secretary to investigate allegations linking Mathai to the CIA back in 1959. In contrast, a subsequent 
biographer of NehruÕs, who was afforded privileged access to his private papers, was unable to unearth any 
evidence linking Mathai to the CIA. See, Judith M. Brown, Nehru: A Political Life (London: Yale University 
Press, 2003), pp. 382-3.  
 18 
 
international assertiveness, and in the form of Nehru, influence within the Non-Aligned 
Movement, all attracted Soviet interest. Moreover, where Soviet politicians led, the nationÕs 
foreign intelligence bodies, in the form of the KGB and Soviet military intelligence, the 
GRU, soon followed. In 1961, with KhrushchevÕs blessing, the young and dynamic KGB 
chairman, Aleksandr Shelepin, launched an aggressive covert campaign designed to 
undermine Western influence across the developing world. By 1967, Leonid Brezhnev had 
replaced Khrushchev, and the future Soviet premier, Yuri Andropov, had taken control of the 
KGB. The strategy of fomenting revolution across Asia, Africa and Latin America, however, 
remained unchanged. Indeed, during the Brezhnev era, the conservative Soviet Foreign 
Minister, Andrei Gromyko, was happy to cede the initiative for much of the Soviet forward 
policy in the developing world to Andropov and the KGB. In turn, Soviet foreign intelligence 
agencies concentrated a large proportion of their operational effort, outside of Europe and 
North America, on India.44 
In May 1966, Chester Bowles warned Lyndon JohnsonÕs National Security Advisor, 
Walt Rostow, that the United States faced, Ôa period of acute competition with the USSR for 
leverage in India.Õ45 Oleg Kalugin, then a rising star in the KGBÕs First Chief (Foreign 
Intelligence) Directorate, has stated that around the time of the Ramparts disclosures: 
 
...we [the KGB] had scores of sources throughout the Indian government Ð in 
intelligence, counterintelligence, the defense and foreign ministries, and the 
police. The entire country was seemingly for sale, and the KGB and the CIA had 
deeply penetrated the Indian government. After a while, neither side entrusted 
sensitive information to the Indians, realizing their enemy would know all about it 
the next day.46 
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The following year, Bowles again urged an increasingly disinterested Washington to take 
heed of, Ôthe massive effort the Communist press and the Communist party [of India] are now 
making to disrupt Indo-American relationships.Õ47 In April 1967, in an article published in the 
American Reporter, a newspaper distributed by the US government in the subcontinent, 
Bowles complained bitterly of the Ôinternational character assassinationÕ being undertaken by 
sections of the Indian media. Communist propaganda in India, the ambassador fulminated, 
had maliciously charged American ÔÒspies and saboteursÓÕ with Ôplotting turn this country 
over to ÒWall Street imperialistsÓ, ÒNeo-ColonialistsÓ, and ÒNeo-Cultural penetrationists.ÓÕ48 
Following that yearÕs Indian general election, for the first time since independence the ruling 
Congress party was faced with a credible parliamentary opposition. At the same time, Indira 
GandhiÕs government was assailed by sluggish economic growth, a food crisis, and a slump 
in export orders. In unfamiliar political territory, senior Congress party figures began to 
question the appetite of the Johnson administration to come to IndiaÕs rescue. 
ÔÔUnfortunately,Õ a dispirited Bowles informed Lyndon Johnson, Ôthe atmosphere in which 
the estimate of [the] future U.S. stance [on India] is being made, is heavily fogged by 
widespread public and Parliamentary uneasiness regarding admitted and alleged CIA 
activities... and general concern about the ability of the U.S. Government to maintain the 
required level of assistance here in view of demands in Vietnam.Õ49 
In actuality, the psychological writing had been on the wall for Indo-US relations 
from the moment that Indira Gandhi became IndiaÕs Prime Minister, in January 1966. As one 
CIA report from September 1973 observed, Ôleft-of-centre Indian officials, including Mrs. 
Gandhi, have long held a conspiratorial view of U.S. activities in India which has been a 
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smouldering source of resentment against the United States.Õ50 To many Western diplomats 
Gandhi appeared ÔvainÕ, ÔemotionalÕ, ÔauthoritarianÕ, and prone to ÔirrationalÕ fits of pique 
when events turned against her.51 Officials in Washington were particularly disconcerted by 
an anti-American undercurrent that appeared to influence many of GandhiÕs actions and 
utterances, a character trait that the Indian premier was commonly perceived to have inherited 
from her father.52  Following one bruising encounter with Gandhi in October 1970, US 
Secretary of State, William Rogers, complained that although the Nixon administration had,  
Ôbeen in office only 20 monthsÕ, the Indian premier was, Ôholding against us a paranoia going 
back to John Foster Dulles.Õ53 An avid consumer of literature with a strong CIA theme, in 
1974 alone Gandhi devoured Victor Marchetti and John MarksÕ, The CIA and the Cult of 
Intelligence, Antony SampsonÕs, The Sovereign State: The Secret History of ITT, and David 
HalberstamÕs, The Best and the Brightest. ÔThe picture she would have [drawn of the CIA] 
from this selection,Õ the American Embassy in New Delhi bemoaned, Ô...would hardly be 
objective.Õ54  
Equally, as one US ambassador to India, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, has pointed out, 
Gandhi had few qualms about co-operating with foreign intelligence agencies, including 
those of the United States, when it suited her interests to do so. In his 1978 memoir, A 
Dangerous Place, Moynihan confirmed that to his knowledge the CIA had twice intervened 
in Indian politics. On both occasions the Agency had funnelled money to the ruling Congress 
Party in a bid to head off the election of communist governments in Kerala and West Bengal. 
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In one instance, the ambassador charged, CIA money was passed directly to Gandhi in her 
capacity as Congress Party President.55 Others have pointed out, that whether she realised it 
or not, GandhiÕs principal political fundraiser during the early 1970s, Lalit Narayan Mishra, 
actively solicited money from the KGB. Rumours abounded in New Delhi at the time of 
suitcases stuffed full of banknotes arriving at the Prime MinisterÕs residence in the dead of 
night. Leonid Shebarshin, a KGB officer stationed in India in the 1970s, has documented an 
occasion on which he personally handed over a gift of two million Indian rupees to Mishra on 
behalf of the Soviet Politburo.56 Moreover, as NehruÕs closest political confidante and, after 
1964, a Cabinet Minister in her own right, it is hard to conceive that Gandhi was not at least 
aware of, if not complicit in, joint initiatives with the CIA which the Indian government 
sanctioned in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war. In 1975, GandhiÕs links to the CIA 
would come back to haunt her when, in the midst of a crusade against the AgencyÕs 
subversive practices, the Hindustan Times began to publish details of the history of the Indian 
governmentÕs relationship with American intelligence. In response, Indira Gandhi affected an 
awkward, and none to convincing, case of prime ministerial amnesia.57 
 
The CIA and Cold War propaganda in India 
 
The success enjoyed by Indian left-wing groups in exploiting the Ramparts disclosures to fan 
concern over CIA interference in IndiaÕs internal affairs alarmed the United StatesÕ British 
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ally. After two hundred years of colonial rule in South Asia, the British retained a significant 
political, economic, and cultural stake in India after 1947.58 London also maintained an 
important intelligence presence in India, both overt, in the form of MI5Õs SLO, and covert, 
through the work of the Information Research Department (IRD). The IRD had been 
established in 1948 to counter the spread of Soviet propaganda in Britain and throughout the 
developing world.59 During the 1950s, its personnel were seconded to British diplomatic 
missions abroad, and tasked with feeding anti-communist literature to networks of local 
journalists and politicians. IRD cultivated a wide range of contacts in India, and counted B. 
N. Mullik, and other senior Intelligence Bureau officers, amongst its customers.60 It was not 
until January 1962, however, that the first permanent IRD representative in India, Peter Joy, 
was posted to the British High Commission in New Delhi under cover provided by the British 
Information Service.61 
 Over the next five years, IRD expanded its work in the subcontinent, establishing 
relationships with independent research centres and Indian government departments, 
including the Ministry of External Affairs, Armed Forces Information Office, Press 
Information Bureau, and All India Radio. By early 1967, Joy was working with over 400 
Ôwell-placed and influential individuals throughout IndiaÕ, some of who received secret 
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payments for their services. In addition, two publishing houses in the Indian capital, and a 
regional newspaper article redistribution scheme, were paid to disseminate IRD material on a 
non-attributable basis through a British cover organisation, the International Forum.62 Under 
JoyÕs guidance, the IRD was particularly successful in cultivating ÔassetsÕ in the Indian press. 
One IRD survey estimated that its material had appeared in over 500 Indian newspaper 
articles during the course of 1964 alone. ÔWe are able,Õ the IRD crowed, Ôto get the right 
article into the right paper at the right time.Õ63 In 1967, having diversified its operations from 
New Delhi to incorporate work in Calcutta and Madras, IRD began lobbying Whitehall for 
permission to take on a more interventionist role in the subcontinent. ÔIRD should,Õ its 
management argued, Ôconcentrate more than hitherto on the cultivation of influential 
Congress Ministers, M.P.Õs and senior civil servants.Õ64 
 Fearful that ÔÒblowbackÓÕ from the anti-CIA campaign in India would compromise 
BritainÕs covert propaganda operation, the United KingdomÕs High Commissioner in New 
Delhi, John Freeman, instructed the IRD to proceed with Ôparticular cautionÕ and temporarily 
curtail some of its riskier activities. IRD officers were temporarily prohibited for seeking new 
Indian contacts, suspended meetings with existing ÔassetsÕ, and implemented tighter security 
measures around the distribution of financial ÔincentivesÕ. In rationalising his decision to 
order a ÔpauseÕ in IRD activity, Freeman argued that the spotlight which had been thrown on 
the CIA in India threatened to, Ôunearth the activities of other Western Missions and perhaps 
link these with C.I.A. Here we should be an obvious target.Õ Furthermore, with communist 
dominated coalition governments having assumed power in Kerala and West Bengal, 
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Freeman was conscious that, Ôthe spread of communist influence is now likely to enter the 
field of Indian domestic politics, and... in the process, the ability of the State Governments to 
uncover Ð or fabricate Ð Òforeign influencesÓ is of course increased.Õ65  
American diplomats in India evinced frustration that Indira GandhiÕs government, if 
not actively directing IndiaÕs leading communist leaning newspapers and magazines, such as 
Patriot, Blitz and Link, to carry salacious and defamatory anti-CIA content, was certainly 
doing very little to discourage the practice. The US Embassy in New Delhi noted that in one 
edition of Patriot, 11! of its 28 pages were taking up with Government advertising. 
Likewise, an American analysis conducted on LinkÕs advertising income revealed that it was 
derived, in large part, from GandhiÕs Congress Party, at both national and state level. 
Moreover, All India Radio, a potent source of information in a country where two out of 
every three adults were illiterate, and the Press Trust of India, both of which were, as the 
British noted, Ôopen to official pressureÕ, infuriated US officials by giving blanket coverage 
to spurious allegations implicating the CIA in subversive activity.66  
Throughout IndiaÕs general election in 1967, the KGB had employed a variety of 
Ôactive measuresÕ in a bid to smear the CIA. Many of these utilised fabricated American 
documents drafted by Service A of the KGBÕs First Chief Directorate, which specialised in 
disinformation. In one instance, a Soviet agent inside the American Embassy in New Delhi 
was able to pass templates of official US documents and sample signatures to the KGB. 
These were then used by Service A to forge a letter nominally from the US Consul-General in 
Bombay, in which it was suggested that the CIA had been channelling large sums of money 
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to S.K. Patil, a right-wing Congress Party MP.67 By leaking a number of similar counterfeit 
letters to the Indian press, the KGB was able to keep the CIA firmly in the public spotlight. 
The Soviet disinformation campaign in India was assisted by the fact that, the CPI journal 
New Age aside, an estimated 16 English language Indian broadsheets, and a far greater 
number of vernacular newspapers, were regarded as, Ôfundamentally in sympathy with the 
Communist lineÕ.68 One Soviet intelligence officer, who served in the KGB residency, or 
station, in New Delhi, subsequently confirmed that in seeking to blacken the CIAÕs reputation 
in the subcontinent, the KGB had made full use of, Ôextensive contacts within political 
parties, among journalists and public organizations. All were enthusiastically brought into 
play.Õ69   
The scale of the Soviet ÔblackÕ propaganda initiative was such that, in the IRDÕs 
estimation, by April 1967 the anti-CIA campaign run in the Indian press had begun, Ôover-
reaching itself and thus blurring the target.Õ Even the New Delhi law practice run by the 
rabidly anti-American former Indian Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, one IRD official 
noted with wry amusement, Ôhas been accused of receiving C.I.A. funds!Õ70 The Soviets 
problems were compounded when the results of the enquiry into CIA ÔinterferenceÕ in IndiaÕs 
general election, which M. C. Chagla had promised the countryÕs exercised parliamentarians, 
became available in June. In the report delivered to Chagla by the IB, both the CIA and the 
KGB were implicated in funding the election campaigns of their preferred candidates. So 
much evidence was accumulated by IndiaÕs intelligence service relating to KGB interference 
in the election, however, that the Soviet Embassy successfully lobbied Chagla to suppress the 
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reports findings.71 Although never quite recapturing the same level of intensity reached in the 
first half of 1967, the KGB and CIA continued to fight a ÔbitterÕ and protracted propaganda 
war in the subcontinent during the final years of the decade.72 In New Delhi, Chester Bowles 
repeatedly voiced concern that the distracted and politically weakened Johnson 
administration was steadily ceding American influence to Soviet Union in South Asia.  ÔThe 
U.S. Government, diverted and confused by Vietnam and social tensions, seems to be pulling 
back [in India],Õ a disconsolate Bowles wrote to Harrison Salisbury, the New York Times 
journalist, in May 1968. ÔIn the meantime the Soviets are successfully stepping up their 
efforts here with a great amount of skills and resources.Õ73 Bowles warning proved to be 
prescient. Under the Nixon administration in the early 1970s, the Soviet Union was to 
redouble its efforts to use the CIA as a political wedge with which to unhinge the United 
StatesÕ relationship with Indira GandhiÕs government.  
 
Indira Gandhi, the Nixon administration and the politics of intelligence  
 
On entering the White House in January 1969, Richard Nixon quickly concluded that peace 
and stability in South Asia could best be maintained by furnishing IndiaÕs rival, Pakistan, 
with sufficient American economic and military assistance to counter-balance New DelhiÕs 
preponderant regional power. Back in the 1950s, Nixon had earned IndiaÕs disfavour by 
enthusiastically supporting the Eisenhower administrationÕs decision to enter into an alliance 
with Pakistan. At the time, the then Vice-President had failed to warm to Nehru, whom he 
considered cold, aloof and bent on consolidating IndiaÕs dominant influence not only in South 
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Asia, but across the Middle East and Africa. NixonÕs National Security Advisor, and latterly 
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, subsequently reflected that the President always felt 
more comfortable dealing with the, Ôbluff, direct military chiefs of PakistanÉthan the 
complex and apparently haughty Brahmin leaders of India.Õ74  
In December 1971, to Indira GandhiÕs fury, Nixon ÔtiltedÕ decisively towards Pakistan 
following the outbreak of Indo-Pakistan hostilities. In turn, having frustrated his effort to 
prevent East PakistanÕs transformation into the independent nation state of Bangladesh, 
Nixon returned GandhiÕs animus.75 After 1971, an atmosphere of deep mutual distrust 
pervaded WashingtonÕs relations with New Delhi. Strained Indo-US tensions were 
subsequently aggravated by differences over issues as diverse as the Gandhi governmentÕs 
ties to the Soviet Union; the on going war in Vietnam; an outstanding rupee debt which New 
Delhi had accumulated purchasing US grain shipments in 1960s; and, IndiaÕs fledgling 
nuclear weapons programme. Within the confines of NixonÕs Oval Office, Indians came to be 
characterised as ÔbastardsÕ, while Gandhi herself was derided as an Ôold witchÕ and a 
ÔbitchÕ.76  
It was with an understandable degree of trepidation therefore, that on 24 July 1972, 
Kenneth Keating, NixonÕs ambassador to India, made a final call on Indira Gandhi before 
returning to the United States to oversee the PresidentÕs re-election campaign.  Keating had 
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anticipated that his encounter with Gandhi might prove awkward. During a thirty-minute 
audience with the Indian premier, however, the ambassador was left stunned by the force of 
the Ôemotional and distortedÕ attack that Gandhi launched against the Nixon administration. 
Significantly, Gandhi chose to vent her spleen by presenting Keating with a long and well-
worn series of allegations linking the CIA with subversive activities in India. Forces inside 
American government, Gandhi assured an incredulous Keating, were Ôworking against us in 
IndiaÕ; Ôcooperating with communist extremistsÕ to destabilise her administration; and 
encouraging Ôa lot of American professors...to engage in improper activities injurious to 
India.Õ ÔIncredible!Õ, the dumbstruck Keating subsequently cabled to Washington, ÔMy 
successor has an even tougher task ahead than I anticipated.Õ77  
The rhetorical barbs that Indira Gandhi threw KeatingÕs way were, in part, driven by 
domestic political expediency. Whenever GandhiÕs domestic fortunes flagged, the Indian 
economy tanked, or the Congress Party found itself in political difficulty, it was all too easy 
to blame the malign influence of a Ôforeign handÕ. During 1969, Gandhi had fallen afoul of 
the Congress PartyÕs elder statesman, known as the Syndicate, by shifting decisively to the 
political left. In July that year, Gandhi nationalised fourteen of IndiaÕs commercial banks, and 
sacked her conservative finance minister, and bitter political rival, Morarji Desai. The 
syndicate reacted by dismissing Gandhi from the Congress Party. In response, Gandhi formed 
a new breakaway party, Congress (R). In February 1971, India held its fifth general election, 
and GandhiÕs reconstituted party, which drew on support from the Moscow sponsored wing 
of the CPI, was returned to power on the back of the slogan, Garibi Hatao, or abolish 
poverty. In the months that followed, the CPI exerted pressure on its Congress (R) partner to 
adopt a radical socialist agenda by organising periodic demonstrations of civil disobedience, 
or Ômass satyagrahaÕ, in support of land reform, full employment, and wealth redistribution.  
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In the autumn of 1972, confronted with mass CPI orchestrated protests against 
rampant inflation, food shortages, and rising unemployment, Gandhi and senior Congress (R) 
officials elected not to admonish their communist allies, but instead to implicate he CIA, and 
the AgencyÕs domestic ÒaccomplicesÓ, with fomenting unrest inside India. Beginning in late 
September, Congress (R) president, S. D. Sharma, delivered a string of public speeches in 
which he claimed to have firm evidence, which despite repeated demands from the Indian 
press he declined to produce, proving that the CIA was colluding with right wing opponents 
of the government to, Ôthrottle the Indian economy.Õ On 9 October, on the eve of a national 
Congress (R) convention in Gujarat, Gandhi added her voice to the chorus of anti-CIA 
rhetoric by openly asserting that: 
 
...elements in India, who had always been voicing opposition to the GovernmentÕs 
political economic and foreign policies, were receiving encouragement from 
foreign sources. The opposition was identical with criticism from abroad not only 
in regard to ideas, but also in the choice of words used. This made it clear that 
there were contacts between IndiaÕs critics at home and abroad.78 
 
 
British officials in India, and much of the countryÕs English language press, dismissed the 
allegations levelled by Sharma and Gandhi at he CIA, as a Ôbarefaced political stunt.Õ The 
British High Commission in New Delhi informed London that the, ÔCPI have plainly been up 
to their necks in recent agitationÕ, whilst, ÔIndian security professionals do not put down [the] 
agitation to [a] CIA conspiracy.Õ79 The right-wing Indian periodical, Thought, observed 
sardonically that Gandhi had chosen to deliver her anti-CIA polemic in the very location 
where Mahatma GandhiÕs autobiography, Experiments with Truth, had played out. In an 
editorial entitled, ÔHitting Out WildlyÕ, CalcuttaÕs respected daily, The Statesman, disparaged 
GandhiÕs implication that IndiaÕs economic difficulties were Ôdue to CIA ÒmachinationsÓÕ, as 
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simply Ôtoo infantile to be considered seriously.Õ80 Casting a satirical, if equally damning eye 
on the CIA rumpus, the Indian Express printed a cartoon on its front page which depicted 
Sharma advising the Indian premier that, ÔÒThis weekÕs CIA activities include four price-rise 
demonstrations, seven buses hijacked by students, plus one cyclone in Orissa.ÓÕ81 
  In lashing out at the CIA, Indira Gandhi undoubtedly calculated that the Agency 
would serve as a convenient external scapegoat for internal troubles, and at the same time 
provide a useful means of placating her CPI ally with a show of anti-Western bluster. 
Moreover, the British suspected that Gandhi would derive no little satisfaction from the 
knowledge that, Ôthese allegations would stick in President NixonÕs gizzard.Õ Not least, 
Indian government officials were fully aware that the CIA, which Nixon denigrated as a 
haven for Ivy League liberals at odds with his political philosophy, represented a particularly 
sensitive pressure point where the President was concerned. While on the surface IndiaÕs 
wider economic and strategic interests suggested that choosing to pick a quarrel with the 
United States made little sense, Gandhi was deemed shrewd enough to reason that, with 
Nixon seemingly assured of a second presidential term, Ôthe US would be in no hurry anyway 
to resume aid, participate in debt rescheduling or make any other gesture towards India. 
Hence further deterioration in Indo/US relations was no skin off her nose while bringing 
internal benefits.Õ82 Having beaten so hard on the anti-CIA drum, senior US officials began to 
worry that Gandhi risked creating a domestic political monster over which she would be able 
to wield increasingly less control. The Congress left wing, it seemed, aided and abetted by the 
CPI, had Ôgradually undercutÕ Indian officials and politicians seeking better Indo-US relations 
and more pragmatic economic policies. ÔIronically this latter group probably includes Mrs. 
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GandhiÉÕ, one US official diplomat, ÔBut the [anti-CIA] campaign is tailored to cater to her 
prejudices and sensitivities.Õ83 
GandhiÕs tendency to conflate political opportunism and the CIA appeared to be 
equally in evidence in June 1975, after the Allahabad High Court controversially found the 
Indian Prime Minister guilty of minor electoral mal-practice during the 1971 general election. 
If upheld by IndiaÕs Supreme Court, the ruling threatened to invalidate GandhiÕs status as an 
MP and bring down her government. Later the same month, with her political opponents 
scenting blood and protestors having taken to IndiaÕs streets in almost equal numbers to both 
support and denounce her, Gandhi declared a State of Emergency, suspended civil liberties, 
and jailed her political opponents. Almost immediately, senior Congress Party figures loyal to 
Gandhi began attributing the unrest that had preceded the imposition of martial law to a 
Ôforeign handÕ, and declared defiantly that the government, Ôwould not allow Delhi to be 
turned into Chile.Õ84 On 15 August, as India commemorated its independence from British 
imperial rule, Gandhi gave an interview to a Congress Party newssheet, Socialist Weekly, in 
which she observed pointedly, ÔHave these several Western countries not given full moral 
and material support to the most authoritarian regimes of Africa and Asia? Have we so soon 
forgotten what happened to Chile?Õ85  
Those members of IndiaÕs political opposition that had avoided imprisonment openly 
mocked the idea that external forces had been plotting to subvert the government. One Indian 
MP took to wearing a badge that proclaimed, ÔI am a CIA agentÕ, and made a tidy profit into 
the bargain by selling on copies to his parliamentary colleagues.86 Within the American 
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Embassy, however, a file of Indian press clippings linking the United States government, and 
more particularly the CIA, with a conspiracy to overthrow Gandhi, grew larger by the day.87 
The KGB residency in New Delhi, which in a reflection of the importance that the Soviet 
intelligence service attached to India, had been upgraded to the status of a main residency in 
the early 1970s, played an especially active part in feeding GandhiÕs suspicion that the CIA 
was actively plotting her demise.88 In doing so, the KGB was able to call upon the services of 
an Indian press agency, two daily and eight weekly Indian newspapers, and four popular 
magazines, all which received covert Soviet funding. During the course of 1972 alone, the 
Soviet residency in New Delhi claimed credit for placing almost 4,000 pro-Soviet and anti-
US articles in the Indian press.89 Whilst it remains likely that KGB officers on the 
subcontinent exaggerated the extent to which they were able to manipulate IndiaÕs media, one 
of the worldÕs leading authorities on the KGB has gone as far as to state that, ÔIndia under 
Indira Gandhi was...probably the area for more KGB active measures than anywhere in the 
world.Õ90  
One of the KGBÕs notable propaganda successes in India occurred in December 1972. 
That month, three of IndiaÕs leading newspapers, The Times of India, Hindustan Times, and 
Indian Express, reproduced a story which had first appeared in the Kuwaiti daily, Al Siyassa. 
The report alleged that the CIA had been complicit in a number of plots to assassinate Indira 
Gandhi. In the Indian parliament, communist MPs seized on the news, and demanded an 
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official investigation to establish its veracity. D. D. Puri, the CPI Member of Parliament for 
Haryana, declared theatrically that the allegation represented: 
 
...the most earth-shaking news...I would like to get an unequivocal assurance from 
the Government that if these is an iota of truth in this, if one-hundredth or even 
one-thousandth of this is true, there is no question of opening trade relations or 
any other type of relations with the United States of America. The Government 
must give us an assurance to this effect here and now.91 
 
 
To the British, the Al Siyassa story displayed all the hallmarks of a Soviet ÔsmearÕ, and 
constituted a clear, Ôstep up in the CIA/KGB slanging match in India.Õ92 Above all, the 
growing sophistication of the Soviet disinformation campaign in India impressed the British. 
Al Siyassa, it was noted, had established a reputation as an independent, politically moderate, 
and well-informed Arab newspaper, with no apparent connection to Soviet intelligence. Its 
editor, Ahmed Jarallah, who was known to senior IRD officers, was regarded as a generally 
pro-Western and conservative figure. In the past, JarallahÕs criticism of the Soviet presence in 
the Middle East had even seen him labelled as a CIA agent. By filtering anti-CIA propaganda 
through Jarallah, or more plausibly a more junior member of the Al Siyassa staff, the British 
conceded that the Soviets had ensured that any suggestion that the newspaper was a vehicle 
for KGB propaganda, Ôwould probably ring false.Õ93 
Moreover, to the intense frustration of American and British officials, the expansion 
of KGB operations in India continued to go largely unreported in the Indian press. Efforts 
made by the CIA, local United States Information Service officials, and the IRD to counter 
Soviet inspired attacks on the CIA by placing articles critical of the KGB in the mainstream 
Indian press, generated relatively modest results. At the height of the 1972 anti-CIA 
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campaign in India, the British could, Ôonly find a handful of recent references to suspected 
KGB activityÕ in the subcontinentÕs newspapers.94 In one sense, the KGBÕs comparative 
anonymity was undoubtedly reflective of the generally positive tenor of Indo-Soviet relations 
under Indira Gandhi. As previously indicated, from the mid-1960s onward, the strength of 
IndiaÕs economic and strategic links with the West steadily dissipated. Increasingly, New 
Delhi looked to Moscow to meet its economic and security needs, rather than Washington or 
London, a shift underlined by the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and 
Co-operation in August 1971. 
Deeper cultural factors, however, may also go some way toward explaining the 
varying levels of Indian interest shown in the CIA and the KGB. At the turn of the 1940s, 
Loy Henderson detected an almost unconscious tendency on the part of Indians to, Ôexercise 
less restraint in finding fault with the United States than with the Soviet Union.Õ Henderson 
attributed this phenomenon to the Ôdeeper emotional responsesÕ evoked in Indians by 
American attitudes to questions of race, colonialism, and wealth redistribution, than by Soviet 
constraints on civil liberties and freedom of expression. Or put another way, the ambassador 
observed, Ôa general feeling [in the subcontinent] that the United States, as the most 
prosperous and technically the most advanced nation, is just a little too smug and that a bit of 
criticism now and then is good for the soul.Õ95 United States Information Agency (USIA) 
surveys broadly supported HendersonÕs impressions. One poll conducted by the USIA on 
ÔIndian Attitudes towards the U.S and U.S.S.RÕ in 1956, revealed that respondents in India 
typically perceived America as ÔaggressiveÕ and ÔexploitativeÕ, while the Soviet Union was 
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generally deemed to be, Ôfriendly to Asian countriesÕ, and possess an, Ôeconomic system 
[that] leads to a rise in the standard of living of all in the country.Õ96 
Specific actions undertaken by the United States government and the CIA in the early 
1970s can also be seen to have played a part in reinforcing the negative perception of 
AmericaÕs foreign intelligence service held many by Indians, and by Indira Gandhi in 
particular. Circumstantial evidence linking the United States with those responsible for the 
assassination of BangladeshÕs premier, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, in August 1975, and 
exposes in The New York Times alleging that the CIA had run an agent inside GandhiÕs 
cabinet during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, unsettled the Indian premier.97 Above all, 
however, the CIAÕs complicity in the bloody right-wing coup that removed the government 
of Salvador Allende in Chile, in September 1973, deeply affected Gandhi. After AllendeÕs 
demise, Indira Gandhi was genuinely concerned that she might be the next target on the 
Nixon administration list for regime change.98  
In a bid to reassure Gandhi that Washington wished her no harm, the American 
Deputy Chief of Mission in New Delhi paid a call on the Indian premier and stated 
unequivocally, Ôthat of course, the US had notÕ meddled in Chilean domestic politics.99 
Weeks later, Gandhi heard the CIAÕs Director, William E. Colby, confirm to a US 
Congressional committee that, between 1970 and 1973, the Agency had spent more than $8 
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million in an effort to destabilize the Allende government.100 Earlier in 1973, shortly after he 
arrived in India to replace Kenneth Keating as US ambassador, Daniel Patrick Moynihan had 
cabled to Henry Kissinger that, ÔThe paranoia out here is thicker than the dust.Õ101 Following 
ColbyÕs testimony, a dispirited Moynihan lamented that by handling the Chile question in 
such an inept manner, the United States government had done a first rate job of shooting 
itself in the foot in India. On 10 September 1974, Moynihan complained to Kissinger that 
Gandhi was now convinced: 
 
...that we would be content to see her overthrown, as we have, to her 
mind, been content to see others like her overthrown. She knows full 
well that we have done our share and more of bloody and 
dishonourable deeds. This as such is not her concern. She knows all 
too much of such matters. It is precisely because she is not innocent, 
not squeamish, and not a moralizer that her concern about American 
intentions is real and immediate. And of course the news from the 
United States, as printed in the Indian press, repeatedly confirms her 
worst suspicions and genuine fears.102 
 
MoynihanÕs gloom deepened further, when the investigative journalist, Seymour Hersh, 
obtained a leaked copy of his cable to Kissinger, and splashed the ambassadorÕs observations 
on Gandhi across the front page of the New York Times.103  
Moreover, to MoynihanÕs fury, Colby went on to compound GandhiÕs anxiety that the 
CIA was out to get her, by mounting a robust public defence of the United StatesÕ need to 
exercise a covert action capability abroad. On 13 September, in an address before the Fund 
for Peace Conference, having first acknowledged the AgencyÕs track record of Ôassist[ing] 
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AmericaÕs friends against her adversaries in their contest for control of a foreign nationÕs 
political directionÕ, Colby proceeded to argue that:  
 
...a sovereign nation must look ahead to changing circumstances. I can 
envisage situations in which the United States might well need to 
conduct covert action in the face of some new threat that developed in 
the world...I thus would think it mistaken to deprive our nation of the 
possibility of some moderate covert action response to a foreign 
problem and leave us with nothing between a diplomatic protest and 
sending the Marines.104 
 
On 2 December, Colby reiterated his support for covert action in an interview published in 
US News & World Report. After being replayed in the Indian press, this had the effect of 
whipping up a Ôwholly predictable stormÕ in the subcontinent. In response, a perplexed 
Moynihan was left ÔgropingÕ for an explanation as to why Colby considered it necessary, or 
advisable, to openly debate the merits and morality of CIA clandestine operations. The 
Director of the KGB, the US ambassador noted ruefully, felt no similar compulsion to air the 
Soviet intelligence services dirty laundry in public. On 3 December, in a stinging cable sent 
to Henry Kissinger, Moynihan asked pointedly, ÔIt is out of the question that some thought 
might be given in Washington to the effect in India of statements such as the Director has 
made? It is that nobody knows? Or is it that nobody cares?Õ105 
Kissinger had, Moynihan reminded the Secretary of State, personally affirmed to 
Gandhi during a visit to New Delhi back in October, that the United States was not Ôdirectly 
or indirectlyÕ engaged in activities designed to destabilise India. ÔIn what but an insane 
situation could a Director of Central IntelligenceÕ, the ambassador speculated, Ô...find himself 
giving interviews to the press asserting a right to do what the Secretary of State had said was 
not being done in India?Õ Half the Indian government, Moynihan emphasised, already 
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suspected that the CIA was up to no good in India, while the other half were astute enough to 
recognise that by demonising the Agency and its purportedly nefarious activities in the 
subcontinent, they could outflank the Congress PartyÕs domestic critics. ColbyÕs outburst of 
candour, Moynihan underlined, had once again increased the likelihood that the CIA would 
be dragged into IndiaÕs internal politics. ÔIs there no wayÕ, the ambassador urged Kissinger, 
Ôthat [ColbyÕs] statement can be retracted?Õ106 
Indira GandhiÕs repeated assertion that the malevolent hand of the CIA lay behind 
most of IndiaÕs problems, whether genuinely held or not, consistently undermined 
WashingtonÕs efforts to normalise Indo-US relations for much of the latter Cold War period. 
As Moynihan had underlined, when visiting India in October 1974, before getting down to 
any substantive business with his hosts, Henry Kissinger felt compelled to publicly affirm the 
ÔKissinger RuleÕ, which committed Washington to repatriate any American official that the 
Indian government suspected of interference in its internal affairs.107 With the Ford 
administration having timed its first major policy statement on Indo-US relations to coincide 
with KissingerÕs arrival in India, the US Embassy in New Delhi optimistically hoped to draw 
some much needed positive publicity in the following days press. Instead, to the satisfaction 
of the KGB, which had passed a familiar batch of fabricated stories of CIA misdeeds on to 
friendly journalists, IndiaÕs newspapers ran with headlines proclaiming, ÔIndia asked to name 
CIA agentsÕ, and ÔSuspicious U.S. Men to be removed from India.Õ108 Despite the assurances 
provided to Gandhi by Moynihan, and his successor, Bill Saxbe, that they would resign if 
evidence emerged of CIA interference in Indian domestic affairs, Indian politicians and 
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sections of the countryÕs media continued to accuse the CIA of acts of subversion throughout 
the 1970s.109 Indeed, an indignant Saxbe spent much of his time as ambassador in India 
between February 1975 and late 1976, making it clear to every senior Indian official that he 
encountered, that an improvement in Indo-US relations, Ôjust cannot take place while the 
Prime Minister and other high Indian leaders continue to poke away at the US.Õ110  
By early 1976, however, with GandhiÕs government having disregarded numerous 
private warnings from the State Department to desist from publicly criticising the CIAÕs 
purported activities in the subcontinent, the Ford administration resolved to punish New 
Delhi. Over the previous five years, the upsurge in anti-American sentiment in India had 
prompted both the United States government and US business to disengage from 
subcontinent. Between 1972 and 1975, the number of staff serving in the US Embassy in 
New Delhi halved. During the same period American companies turned their backs on India, 
with fewer than 40 US businessmen living and working amongst 600 million Indians.111 In 
Washington, IndiaÕs ambassador, T. N. Kaul, was frozen out by the White House and denied 
access to both President Ford and Kissinger. In January 1976, the Ford administration 
ratcheted up pressure on Gandhi by announcing the curtailment of a range of joint Indo-US 
scientific and educational programmes, and the postponement plans to resume developmental 
assistance to India, which had been halted back in 1971 during the Indo-Pakistan War. Given 
IndiaÕs continuing financial problems, the latter measure was expected to hit GandhiÕs 
government particularly hard. Between 1965 and 1971, India had received $4.2 billion in 
American economic aid, $1.5 billion of which had been appropriated during the early years of 
the Nixon administration. In rationalising the United StatesÕ punitive policy to IndiaÕs 
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Foreign Minister, Y.B. Chavan, Saxbe confirmed that the Ford administration had simply run 
out of patience with Indira Gandhi and her government. Ô[We have] reach[ed] a point,Õ Saxbe 
informed Chavan, Ôat which we don't feel can continue to cooperate if [these] attacks [on the 
CIA] continue. We have said repeatedly that if the G[overnment] O[f] I[ndia] has any 
evidence of US interference we will act to eliminate it. I would resign.Õ112  
  
Banishing the rogue elephant: Recasting contemporary Indo-US intelligence relations  
 
In the context of the early 1970s, the US governmentÕs contention that the CIA was not 
involved in subversive activity in India, undoubtedly contained more than an element of 
truth. There is no doubt, however, that the Central Intelligence Agency had actively sought to 
influence IndiaÕs internal political landscape in the early Cold War period. During the first 
two decades following IndiaÕs independence, the CIA had a complex, and often conflicted 
relationship with the countryÕs political elite and the nationÕs media. Despite the criticisms 
levelled at the Agency by IndiaÕs first premier, Jawaharlal Nehru, a number of CIA covert 
operations in the subcontinent were undertaken with the full knowledge and support of 
IndiaÕs intelligence service, and senior figures inside the ruling Congress Party. In the late 
1950s, in Kerala, the CIA worked with the Congress Party to destabilise a democratically 
elected communist administration. For much of the 1960s, following the Sino-Indian border 
war, the Agency assisted the Indian government in strengthening its defences against an 
external threat from the PeopleÕs Republic of China. From 1967 onwards, the appearance of 
an embarrassing sequence of very public revelations implicating the CIA in illegal and 
morally questionable activities, both at home and abroad, propelled the Agency into the 
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centre of a political storm in the subcontinent which, while varying in its intensity, was to 
remain a dominant feature of wider Indo-US relations for the remainder of the Cold War. 
It proved an enduring source of frustration to US government officials in the latter 
Cold War period that, at a time when the American intelligence presence in India was in 
retreat, and that of the Soviet Union expanding exponentially, the CIA remained firmly in the 
cross hairs of IndiaÕs politicians and press. In part, manifestations of an Indian Ônational 
paranoiaÕ when it came to CIA can be explained in terms of the deterioration in wider Indo-
US relations that occurred toward the end of the Johnson administration and, more especially, 
after the Nixon/Kissinger tilt towards Pakistan in 1971. Nonetheless, other political and 
cultural factors undoubtedly played a significant role in shaping Indian perceptions of the 
CIA. Specifically, the CIAÕs heightened public profile after 1967, both globally and in the 
subcontinent, transformed it into a convenient vehicle through which Indian politicians were 
able to vent populist anti-American sentiment. Furthermore, Indira GandhiÕs appreciation that 
the Agency could serve as political lightening-rod, deflecting attention away from her PartyÕs 
mismanagement of IndiaÕs formidable domestic problems, propelled the CIA to the forefront 
of official Indo-US discourse.  
In one sense, the conspiratorial paradigm that gained such traction amongst sections 
of IndiaÕs political elite and national media can be explained in terms of the nationÕs historic 
familiarity with the shadowy work of ÔforeignÕ intelligence organisations in the subcontinent, 
which stretched back to the eighteenth century.113 Equally, the ÔconspiracismÕ that gripped 
hold of India from the late 1960s, is suggestive of a more contemporary post-colonial 
expression of nationalism, not dissimilar to that evident in the Middle East. In India during 
the premiership of Indira Gandhi, or for that matter, Gamal Abdul NasserÕs Egypt, or 
Ayatollah Ruhollah KhomeiniÕs Iran, an inability to effectively tackle endemic social and 
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economic problems invited the temptation to court popular legitimacy by explaining away the 
national ills in terms of the machinations of a Ôforeign hand.Õ114 Moreover, the fact that 
leaders in the developing world were able to point to genuine attempts undertaken by 
Western intelligence services to subvert the sovereignty of independent nation states, be they 
in Chile or elsewhere, made it all the easier to divert attention away from uncomfortable daily 
realties, and towards invariably illusory constructions of external subversion. 
Likewise, when interpreted through the lens of the Nehru/Gandhi dynastyÕs personal 
interaction with Western intelligence agencies, the CIAÕs demonization in India appears less 
surprising. Having witnessed first hand the full force of a repressive British security system 
while participating in IndiaÕs fight for independence, it is unsurprising that Indira Gandhi 
acquired a highly developed sense of suspiciousness and distrust which, at times, appeared to 
border on the paranoid. It appears perfectly plausible, if difficult to establish beyond doubt, 
that the NixonÕs administrationÕs tilt toward IndiaÕs regional rival Pakistan, coupled with 
public revelations surrounding CIAs misdeeds, and not least the AgencyÕs complicity in 
bloody coups in Bangladesh and Chile, triggered a strain of persecutory paranoia buried 
within Indira GandhiÕs psyche. Certainly behavioural traits associated with persecutory 
paranoia, principally strong feelings of mistrust and a powerful inclination to deny ones own 
insecurities and hostilities and to project them onto others, appear all to evident in GandhiÕs 
words and deeds in relation to the CIA.115  
It was not until after the Cold War had ended, the Soviet UnionÕs relationship with 
India had faltered, and the strangle hold exercised by the Nehru/Gandhi family on Indian 
politics had loosened, albeit fleetingly, that the CIA ceased to be a defining factor in Indo-US 
relations. Surprisingly little attention has been given by contemporary scholars to the wider 
political dimension of the Indo-American intelligence relationship. This represents a 
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remarkable historical omission given the extent to which Indian rhetorical attacks on the CIA, 
both official and unofficial, impacted upon WashingtonÕs wider relationship with New Delhi 
from the late 1960s onwards. Moreover, from a more parochial standpoint, it appears likely 
that the CIAÕs inability to remain out of the Indian political spotlight for long compromised 
its operational effectiveness in the subcontinent. Here, it is noteworthy that the CIA failed to 
anticipate nuclear tests conducted by India in 1974 and 1998.116 Since, 1991, the end of one 
war, and the beginning of another, has transformed the CIAÕs relationship with India. 
Significantly, in 2009, the first overseas trip Leon Panetta made after becoming Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency was to New Delhi, to hold talks on intelligence co-operation 
in the Ôwar on terrorÕ with his Indian counterpart.117 Yet, perhaps the most telling 
confirmation that the CIA has finally turned a corner in its relationship with India came in 
June 2011. At the time, the subcontinents newspapers were busy reporting on the destruction 
that rogue elephants had wrought in the southern Indian city of Mysore, and, not once, was 
the AgencyÕs name mentioned.118  
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